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doi:10.1016/j.jfma.2011.12.005Background/Purpose: In 2005, a self-management program, based on the global budget system
that met the criteria for reducing Cesarean delivery rates, was introduced to obstetric prac-
tices in Taiwan. The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of different national
health policies on the Cesarean delivery rate at a tertiary hospital.
Methods: We constructed a Poisson regression model and conducted an interrupted time series
analysis to detect the effects of the implementation of each health policy on Cesarean deliv-
eries. We used data collected at two points before the implementation of the global budget
system (GBS) policy (in 2001 and 2002), and at two points after the implementation of the
hospital-based self-management (HBSM) policy (in 2005 and 2010). All monthly data were
collected at these time points.
Results: Between June 2001 and August 2010, the rate of improvement of vaginal birth after
Cesarean section (VBAC) during Period 1 revealed that VBAC may have long-term effects
(p < 0.001). While there may have been a remarkable immediate improvement in the VBAC
rate (pZ 0.0276) in Period 3, the long-term effect of VBAC seemed to have decreased during
the same period (pZ 0.0003). Following the synergistic impacts of health policy implementa-
tion during Period 3, the immediate improved total Cesarean section (C/S) rate seemed to be
maintained at an average value (p Z 0.0183).
Conclusion: Over the long term, the C/S rate seemed to reach a plateau; the immediate effect
on the VBAC rate was a significant increase consistent with that of the initial health policy
implementation.
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ment and compensation for a C/S is greater than that forThe concern about and interest in Cesarean sections (C/S)
with regard to health care quality are relatively recent
developments in Taiwan.1 In fact, it is a concern that has
become particularly important in many countries.2,3,4 The
C/S rate could be influenced by many factors, including
maternal demographic factors, decision making by obste-
tricians, prenatal care factors, intrapartum and postpartum
factors, as well as patient choices. Evidence from previous
studies suggests that Cesarean delivery may increase the
occurrence of severe maternal and perinatal morbid-
ities.5,6,7 Accordingly, a reduced C/S rate has become an
indicator of quality health care in many developed coun-
tries.8,9,10 National health policies may influence the
results of the measurements of such indicators.
The Taiwan National Health Insurance Program was
implemented in 1995 to provide fee-for-service health care
on a population basis, and it was expanded in 2002 to
provide hospital services under the global budgeting
design.11
The escalating costs of health care, which were imple-
mented as the result of a growing aging population, the
development of new technology, and 100% national health
insurance plan coverage, caused a deficit in the country’s
annual budget. The global fee-for-service payment system,
which covers thousands of hospitals and primary care
physician practices, each billing against a budget, poses
significant utilization management challenges for the
profession.12,13,14
The term “global budget system” refers to direct and
complete government funding of hospitals on a prospective
basis. This system tends to result in resource allocation and
cost control, including cost containment, funding certainty,
easier and cheaper administration, improved coordination
and planning of services, and the elimination of unneces-
sary services.15 Each hospital in Taiwan has “global fund-
ing” distributed by the Bureau of National Health Insurance
and the steering committee of the Taiwan Medical Associ-
ation. The definition of the “hospital-based self-
management program” is based on the hospital global
budget system, which for our purposes, refers to a strategy
employing postoperative peer reviews and audits to reduce
medical service costs incurred by C/S.
The fee-for-service incentive and various management
problems pose serious obstacles for the reduction of C/S
rates.
Literature and data concerning the physician’s
perspective on the Cesarean delivery rate in Taiwan are
currently insufficient. Furthermore, C/S rate trend analysis
is lacking in that an effective strategy for auditing and
monitoring physicians’ decision-making behavior and
results is unavailable. The purpose of this study was to
examine the influence of the global budget strategy under
the National Health Insurance system and to conduct
retrospective peer review evaluations and physician self-
regulation management interventions for C/S rates and
other performance indicators at a tertiary hospital in
Taiwan.
We recognized and assumed that general practitioners
and obstetricians are likely to perform C/S owing torevenue-based and fee-for-service practices.8 Reimburse-
a normal spontaneous vaginal delivery (NSD). It also must
be noted that some patients may request C/S because of
cultural or personal issues. Elective C/S may be paid for in
part by the patient, out-of-pocket.
We then hypothesized that the impact of the national
health policy of the global budget system and the hospital-
based self-management strategy could reduce the total C/S
rate in a tertiary hospital.Patients and methods
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board
of Chang Gung Memorial Hospital in Tao-Yuan, Taiwan (No.
98-1049B).
We assessed all pregnant women who delivered babies
by Cesarean section between June 2001 and August 2010 at
Chang Gung Memorial Hospital in Linkou, Taiwan. The
hospital global budget system (GBS) was implemented in
July 2002 with the support of the health policy and with
regard to the Taiwan Quality Indicators Project (TQIP).
Similarly, the hospital-based self-management (HBSM) and
physician self-disciplinary management programs were
implemented in August 2005. Concurrently, peer review
evaluation had been conducted on the C/S rate in tertiary
hospitals.
C/S rates were analyzed before and after the initiation
of the GBS and HBSM policies and the results of these
analyses were compared. Delivery methods by surgical
intervention included C/S, vaginal birth after Cesarean
section (VBAC), primary C/S (PCSR), and repeated C/S
(RCSR). The study was conducted over three periods: Period
1 refers to the period preceding the implementation of the
GBS in 2002; Period 2 refers to the time between the
implementation of the GBS and HBSM in 2005; and Period 3
refers to the period encompassing physician self-
disciplinary management.
We used descriptive characteristics and selective
performance indicators of obstetrics care to audit whether
the outcome measures fulfilled certain criteria of health
care quality, and then employed two statistical
approaches, Poisson regression and interruptive time series
analysis. Poisson regression was used to compare the
monthly C/S rates in Period 3 with the corresponding
monthly C/S rates in Periods 1 and 2. The outcome
measurement of Poisson regression was demonstrated as
a dependent variable. Calculations were presented as the
log of the ratio of observed to expected C/S rates. We used
interrupted time series analyses to test the effects of the
different health policy implementations on C/S rates.16
Two regression models were used to estimate the trends
of the C/S rates in the different study periods. We con-
ducted a nonparametric analysis to evaluate the observed
distribution of the monthly C/S rates among different
perspectives using Poisson regression and interrupted time
series analyses. The Friedman test was used in a three-
phased time interval and the Wilcoxon signed rank test
was used to test the significance of the mean values among
three different phases. All p values were two sided and
Table 1 C/S rate during period 1 (NHIS before GBS), period 2 (after GBS but before HBSM), and period 3 (after GBS and HBSM).
Characteristics Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
n (%) n (%) n (%)
C/S rate 1751/4988 (35.10) 4286/11680 (36.70) 6794/18948 (35.86)
Primary C/S 989/4188 (23.62) 2630/9793 (26.86) 4471/16327 (26.87)
Repeated C/S 762/800 (95.3) 1656/1887 (87.76) 2323/2621 (88.63)
VBAC Rate 38/800 (4.75) 231/1887 (12.24) 298/2621 (11.37)
C/S rate Z total C/S rate [HBSM on August, 2005]; NHIS National Health Insurance System; HBSM Z Hospital-based self-management.
The impact of health policy on the Cesarean section rate 95a p value of less than 0.05 was used to indicate statistical
significance. The time series analysis helps the researcher
identify changes in the level and slope of the series that
occurs as a result of the different health policy interven-
tions, with the goal being to estimate the treatment’s
effect on the basic regression discontinuity design.
We used the following equation to test the effect of the
introduction of the directory assistance:
YZ b0 þ b1T þ b2Z þ e
where Y is the outcome variable, T is the time (by month) of
change, b₁ is the slope of the regression equation, b₂ is the
treatment effect (the change in the level of the series at
the point of intervention), and Z is the intervention effect.
Similarly, with regard to Poisson regression, we evalu-
ated the effect of the rate ratio among the different time
periods after policy implementation.
Results
We analyzed 35,616 deliveries (mean 321 per month),
including 12,831 C/S deliveries (mean 116 per month), with
a mean total C/S rate of 36.03%. The mean value of PCSR
was 26.7%; RCSR was 89.3%, and the successful VBAC rate
was 10.68% per month between June 2001 and August 2010.
The C/S rates before and after the implementation of the
GBS were 35.1% and 36.18%, respectively. The C/S rate
after the implementation of the HBSM was 35.86%. In
addition, the RCSR rates before and after GBS were 95.3%
and 88.27%, respectively, and 88.63% after the imple-
mentation of the HBSM.
An interrupted time series analysis was conducted for
VBAC rates, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Table 3 presents the
trending of the long-term effects (slope) and immediate
changes (level) of health policy implementation in the
different categories of Cesarean deliveries. Table 4 pres-
ents the long-term effects on the rate of improvement of
VBAC from Period 1 [rate ratio (RR), 1.2206; 95% confidenceTable 2 C/S rate during period 1 (before GBS), period 2 (after
Characteristics Period 1 Period 2
n (%) n (%)
Total C/S Rate 1751(35.10) 4286 (36.70)
Primary C/S 989 (23.62) 2630 (26.86)
Repeated C/S 762 (95.25) 1656 (87.76)
VBAC 38 (4.75) 231 (12.24)
Note: Using c2 or Chi-square analysis; VBAC Z vaginal birth after Cesinterval (CI), 1.1133-1.3498, p < 0.001]. This effect per-
sisted in Period 2, but it seemed to reach a plateau (RR,
0.8238; 95% CI, 0.7444e0.9038, p Z 0.0001). The imme-
diate effect seen in Period 3, following policy imple-
mentations, reveals a remarkable improvement in the VBAC
rate (RR, 1.4378; 95% CI, 1.0432e1.9919, p Z 0.0276).
However, the long-term effect of improvements in the
VBAC rate ratio seemed to decrease during Period 3 (RR,
0.9755, 95% CI, 0.9624e0.9888, p Z 0.0003). The Poisson
regression model analysis revealed that the trend (level and
improvement of change in terms of the rate ratio) of the
different patterns of Cesarean delivery during the three
periods was consistent with the results of the interrupted
time series and segmented regression analysis shown in
Fig. 1. The synergistic effects of health policy imple-
mentation during Period 3 resulted in an immediate effect
of improvement on the total C/S rate, which seemed to
hold to an average value (RR, 0.9109; 95% CI,
0.8430e0.9845, p Z 0.0183). The long-term effect of
improvement on the total C/S rate will be disputable, but it
will not reach statistical significance (RR, 1.0001, 95% CI,
0.9970e1.0032, p Z 0.9471) (Fig. 2).Discussion
Our major findings indicate that total Cesarean rates may
not decrease significantly following the implementation of
a national health policy. VBAC was affected significantly at
the beginning because of incentive mechanisms such as
policy implementation and encouragement, in which
reimbursement of VBAC costs would be equivalent to
Cesarean delivery, but it reached a plateau because of the
potential risk of uterine rupture.5 However, a majority of
C/S deliveries would eventually result in RCSR.
Few studies have dealt with the direct impact of health
policy on the C/S rates in Taiwan. In its annual report in
1996, The Taiwan Society of Perinatology recorded a total
C/S rate of 35.0%, including 59.3% PCSR and 40.7% RCSRGBS but before HBSM), and period 3 (after GBS and HBSM).
Period 3 Period 1 vs. 2 2 vs. 3
n (%) p p
6794 (35.86) 0.0525 0.1409
4471 (27.38) <0.001 0.3605
2323 (88.63) <0.001 0.3950
298 (11.37) <0.001 0.3950
arean section.
Table 3 The trend (slope) and immediate change (level) after health policy implementation (intervention) in different
categories of Cesarean delivery.
Periods 1e2 Periods 2e3
(June, 2001eJuly 2005) (August 2005eAugust 2010)
TCS Level (1.577) p (0.399) Level (-3.462) p (0.003)
Slope (0.142) p (0.534) Slope (0.001) p (0.991)
PCS Level (1.206) p (0.487) Level (-2.493) p (0.030)
Slope (0.018) p (0.930) Slope (-0.061) p (0.196)
RCS Level (-0.640) p (0.804) Level (-5.246) p (0.006)
Slope (0.862) p (0.008) Slope (0.272) p (0.001)
VBAC Level (0.641) p (0.803) Level (5.244) p (0.006)
Slope (-0.862) p (0.008) Slope (-0.272) p (0.001)
All results were computed from interrupted time series and segmental regression analyses.
TCS Z total Cesarean sections; PCS Z primary Cesarean section; RCS Z repeated Cesarean section; VBAC Z vaginal birth after
Cesarean section. p Z p value.
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ed.1This highlights the trend of a high percentage of
Cesarean delivery rates prior to universal coverage. Several
other studies conducted in Taiwan in the last decade have
dealt with the C/S rate. Lin (2004) stated that the C/S
delivery profile showed a significantly lower clinical
threshold for triggering C/S decisions in Taiwan, especially
in OB-GYN clinics.17 Wen (2008) found that National Health
Insurance (NHI) implementation in Taiwan might achieve
the goals of accelerated health improvement and health
care disparity reduction. However, these studies did not
mention health improvement initiatives that could enhanceTable 4 Poisson regression analyses of Cesarean delivery rates
Obstetric care 2001: Period before HGBS
Rate of Improvement in Period 1
95% CI p
Total C/S 0.9965 (0.9841e1.0091) 0.5826
Primary C/S 1.0025 (0.9858e1.0194) 0.7739
Repeated C/S 0.9908 (0.9724e1.0095) 0.3348
VBAC 1.2206 (1.1133e1.3498) <0.001
July 2002eAugust 2005 (compare to 2001*)
Change of Rate from Period 1 to Period
95% CI p
Total C/S 1.0049 (0.9920e1.0179) 0.4592
Primary C/S 1.0012 (0.9843e1.0185) 0.8874
Repeated C/S 1.0085 (0.9893e1.0281) 0.3892
VBAC 0.8238 (0.7444e0.9038) 0.0001
July 2005e2010
95% CI
Total C/S 1.0001 (0.9970e
Primary C/S 0.9977 (0.9938e
Repeated C/S 1.0032 (0.9982e
VBAC 0.9755 (0.9624e
2001* refers to the “period before HGBS”; 2002* refers to the “perio
HGBS Z hospital global budget system; HBSM Z hospital-based self-mthe quality of obstetric care measured by C/S rates.18 Liu
(2007) indicated that gender preference could increase the
C/S rate; the rate slightly increased to 33.68% after NHI
implementation, climbing to 34.47% by 2000.19 In terms of
financial incentives, our VBAC rates started at 4.8%,
increased to 12.2%, and then reached a plateau, gradually
decreasing later on. This is similar to the trend shown by Lo
(2008) in which the VBAC fee rose in April 2003, from 3.5%
to 4.8% in 2004, and to 4.9% in 2005.8 The fee equivalence
policy of VBAC was raised to the level of Cesarean delivery
and implemented in May 2005, but it was not very
impactful.adjusted Cesarean delivery rate ratio (95% CI).
July 2002eAugust 2005 (compare to 2001)
Change of Level from Period 1 to Period 2
95% CI p
1.0425 (0.9362e1.1621) 0.4501
1.0467 (0.9091e1.2073) 0.5286
0.9891 (0.8394e1.1686) 0.8971
0.9009 (0.5414e1.5575) 0.6978
August 2005e2010 (compare to 2002*)
2 Chang of Level from Period 2 to Period 3
95% CI p
0.9109 (0.8430e0.9845) 0.0183
0.9126 (0.8284e1.0058) 0.0646
0.9498 (0.8356e1.0802) 0.4316
1.4378 (1.0432e1.9919) 0.0276
(compare to 2002*)
Change of Rate from Period 2 to Period 3
p
1.0032) 0.9471
1.0016) 0.2427
1.0082) 0.2069
0.9888) 0.0003
d after July 2002 HGBS eAugust 2005 HBSM”.
anagement.
Figure 1 VBAC curve after the interrupted time series
analysis.
The impact of health policy on the Cesarean section rate 97Many factors could lead to an increased C/S rate,
including maternal demographic factors, fetal variables,
and intrapartum events. High C/S rates may be caused by
the increase in the induction of labor, and continuous use of
fetal electronic monitoring.20 Klemetti (2010) found that
the C/S was most common in educated, wealthy women in
Eastern China, who received prenatal care and gave birth at
high quality hospitals.21
In our study, the primary C/S rate was around 25% during
the three periods, despite changes in management and
incentive policies. This might be due to some cultural and
practical factors, and the ever-accumulating medico-legalFigure 2 The trend (level and improvement of change in terms of
three periods using poisson regression analysis.issues of the past decade. Because up to 70% of claims are
based on abnormal cardiotocographs, the most common
obstetric cause of dispute was attributable to intrapartum
hypoxic encephalopathy due to fears of performing a late
diagnosis of fetal distress when Cesarean delivery would
have been appropriate.22 Our findings have three clear
policy implications, as it is now known that the total C/S
rate and RCSR may not be affected by strategic policies and
that VBAC rates may be lowered, at least temporarily, by
using health policy and incentive strategies.
Ennen (2009) revealed that the risk factors for Cesarean
delivery in women undergoing an indicated induction of
labor include a low Bishop’s score, high BMI, nulliparity, and
diabetes.23 However, Wilkinson (1998) found that four
causes accounted for 82% of C/S operations in singleton
pregnancies: (1) elective operation for breech presenta-
tions; (2) emergency prelabor operations due to fetal
distress; (3) emergency sections during labor because of
failure to progress; and (4) recommended RCSR.24 In addi-
tion, physicians’ clinical judgment and practice styles also
might be influential in this regard. Several strategies could
be used to reduce Cesarean section rates, including effec-
tive medical auditing of labor management;25 depart-
mental policy commitment, followed by goal setting and
peer review;26 and mandatory second opinions.27 We also
must consider the question of whether, “C/S rate could still
become the quality indicator of obstetric health care and
surrogate of financial incentives in the future” as stated by
Cyr (2006).28 He continues to state that, “an ideal Cesarean
section rate cannot be defined outside a framework of
individual value and assumptions. Because the Cesareanrate ratio) of different patterns of Cesarean delivery during the
98 C.-M. Liu et al.rate is calculated post hoc, it is impossible to design
a prospective trial comparing specific cesarean section
rate.”28 Our study has several limitations. First, we did not
have a control group. Second, we calculated monthly mean
Cesarean section numbers, rather than assessing individual
physician profiles. Third, for the second and third phases of
the study period, we cannot separate each intervention or
remove any of the composites to observe possible differ-
ences based on knowledge “diffusion” effects. Fourth, our
estimates were based on a single hospital, and the results
may not be sufficiently generalized to other health care
settings. Finally, in this Poisson regression model and time
series trend analysis, it is not easy to track individual
physicians’ decision-making behavior in performing a C/S.
Furthermore, it was difficult to control for emergency
versus nonemergency conditions, and we cannot correlate
some intrapartum factors that might affect obstetricians’
decision making. We would have to preclude elective
Cesarean deliveries in order to calculate indicated
Cesarean delivery rates.In conclusion, between 2001 and
2010, the long-term effect of the total C/S rate seemed to
reach a plateau, and the immediate effect of VBAC rates
revealed effects that are consistent with that of the initial
health policy implementation. However, the long-term
effect on the VBAC rate was still disputable, although this
may be a result of the synergistic effects of the health
policy implementation. This result may imply the possibility
of some potential risks existing within VBAC procedures and
process. The total Cesarean delivery rates have not
changed significantly; they are still around 36%.References
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